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II. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION*
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have only
that power authorized by Article III of the Constitution and statutes
enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.' Several consequences arise
from this "limited" nature of federal court jurisdiction. For example,
parties cannot create jurisdiction by agreement 2 nor waive the lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction.3 Either party or the court may
raise the lack of jurisdiction at any time in the case,4 and there is a
presumption against federal jurisdiction.5 Nevertheless, a party's
cause may be best served in a federal forum. Therefore, attorneys
have a duty to clearly understand the elements necessary to establish
federal jurisdiction. Along with that duty is the responsibility to
follow developments that arise in the area of federal jurisdiction.
The purpose of this article is to apprise attorneys of the key recent
developments in one particular area of federal justification: diversity
jurisdiction.
The most common explanation for the creation of diversity
jurisdiction is that it grew out of a fear that state courts would be
prejudiced against out-of-state parties.6  However, many
commentators argue that with advancements in travel and
* Amy L. Levinson: J.D./M.B.A Candidate, May 2005, Loyola Law School
& Loyola Marymount University; B.B.A., Goizueta Business School of Emory
University, May 2002. Thanks to the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
editors and staff for their extraordinary work and dedication, my family for
their encouragement, and especially Adam Siegel for his endless support.
1. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 534 (1986); see
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites du Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
5. See China Basin Props., Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp.
1301, 1303 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
6. For further discussion on the history and purpose of diversity
jurisdiction, see John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial
System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1948).
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communication, this fear is no longer justified.7 Although Congress
has rejected the complete abolishment of diversity jurisdiction, it
recognizes the need to restrict federal jurisdiction when local bias
does not exist.8 In addition, Congress generally favors restricting
diversity jurisdiction out of its concern for the rising caseload of the
federal courts.
9
This article will discuss a number of recent opinions involving
diversity jurisdiction, focusing on the federal courts' continuing
adherence to Congress's intent to restrict a party's access to federal
court. Many of the recent developments in the area of diversity
jurisdiction stem from the onset of globalization. Section A focuses
on developments in the area of alienage jurisdiction. As modem
commerce has become increasingly international, courts have seen
an increase in the number of foreign citizens permanently residing in
the United States as well as U.S. citizens living abroad. Section B
focuses on establishing the citizenship of entities, particularly those
not explicitly addressed by Congress. Today's business entities are
significantly different than those of the past, in both their complex
organization and their global presence. As a result, courts have had
to interpret jurisdictional principles in light of new realities. Not
surprisingly, circuits have reached inconsistent conclusions, giving
rise to splits of authority. Section C discusses recent developments
7. See id.
8. In its 1958 legislation concerning corporate citizenship, Congress
appropriately restricted diversity jurisdiction, after recognizing that locally
present corporations were invoking diversity jurisdiction against other local
citizens based on a corporate charter from another state. See S. REP. No. 85-
1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102-03.
9. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969) ("[Congress's]
purpose [for increasing the amount in controversy requirement] was to check,
to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts, especially with regard
to the federal courts' diversity of citizenship jurisdiction."). In some areas,
however, Congress has recently expanded diversity jurisdiction and may do so
again soon. For example, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, which became
effective in 2002, provides for federal jurisdiction for litigation arising out of a
single accident in which at least seventy-five persons died. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1369 (Supp. 2004). Moreover, the statute adopts the requirement of only
"minimal diversity." Id. In addition, the proposed Class Action Fairness Act
of 2003 would expand federal court jurisdiction over multistate class actions.
For further discussion on the Class Action Fairness Act, see infra Part VI.D.2.
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in the amount in controversy requirement. It focuses on clarifying
the aggregation rules regarding punitive damages and attorney's fees.
Section D offers a brief conclusion.
A. Alienage Jurisdiction
Section 1332 explicitly allows for district court original
jurisdiction over controversies between:
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state.., as plaintiff and citizens of a State or
of different States.'
0
While the first category involves interstate diversity cases, the
second and third involve what is known as "alienage jurisdiction."
1. Permanent-resident-alien amendment to § 1332
In recent years, the nature of both business and individual
activity has expanded across national borders, leading courts to
address various new issues regarding alienage jurisdiction. In 1988,
for example, Congress amended § 1332(a), providing that "an alien
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled."
'"I
Thus, if a Texas citizen sues a foreign citizen who is a permanent
resident alien domiciled in Texas, diversity jurisdiction will not exist.
Because both parties arguably have ties to Texas, there is no longer a
need to protect the foreign citizen against any bias in state court
litigation. 12  Clearly, the legislature intended to restrict diversity
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000). In addition, the controversy must
"exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." Id.
11. Id. Note that the 1988 amendment only applies to aliens who have
received permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
remain permanently in this country. See Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman &
Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1997) (refusing to invoke the
permanent resident alien provision in a case involving an alien who merely
intended to reside in the United States permanently).
12. See Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir.
1998) (suggesting that the amendment eliminates the ability of permanent
resident aliens to invoke diversity jurisdiction when the case is "more properly
Summer 2004] 1409
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jurisdiction in actions between U.S. citizens and permanent resident
aliens. Nevertheless, the amendment creates the possibility for
expanded federal jurisdiction.
One instance that could involve the expansion of jurisdiction is a
suit solely between aliens. For example, does the amended statute
create federal jurisdiction over a suit between a foreign citizen and
another foreign citizen who is a permanent resident of Texas?
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the possibility, most
courts and commentators agree that such expansion would be
unconstitutional. 13 Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution extends
the federal judicial power to all cases between a citizen of a state and
a citizen or subject of a foreign country. 14 The federal judicial power
cannot, however, extend to cases solely involving aliens. As a result,
interpreting the 1988 amendment to provide diversity jurisdiction for
a case involving only aliens would be unconstitutional.' 5
a. circuit split regarding ability to expand jurisdiction
A circumstance in which the permanent-resident-alien
amendment is more likely to expand rather than restrict jurisdiction
is a suit between two aliens with a U.S. citizen on either side. For
example, if a Texas citizen and a foreign citizen together sue another
foreign citizen, the complete diversity requirement would appear not
to bar federal jurisdiction if one of the foreign citizens is a permanent
resident of Kansas. Note that Article III of the Constitution no
longer presents a problem when a U.S. citizen is a party.16 More
importantly, the complete diversity rule is statutory, and thus an
interpretation of the amendment that limits the complete diversity
viewed as a local matter analogous to a case between citizens of the same
state.").
13. See, e.g., Matsuda v. Wada, 128 F. Supp. 2d 659 (D. Haw. 2000); Banci
v. Wright, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999); see also John B. Oakley,
Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The
Judicial Improvement Acts of 1988 and 1990,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 741,
745 (1991).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. See Matsuda, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 664; Banci, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
16. See Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that the constitutional issue that exists when one alien sues another does not
apply to the present case because there is a U.S. citizen party, thereby
satisfying minimal diversity).
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requirement does not violate the Constitution. 17 Nevertheless, such
an expansion of federal jurisdiction may conflict with the intent of
Congress to reduce alienage jurisdiction.' 8  Two appellate courts
have addressed this issue, reaching contrary results.
The D.C. Circuit refuses to interpret the permanent-resident-
alien amendment as a tool for expanding diversity jurisdiction. The
court in Saadeh v. Farouki'9 found jurisdiction lacking when a
foreign citizen brought suit in federal court against another foreign
citizen permanently residing in the United States and a U.S.
corporation. 20  Literal application of the amendment would allow
federal jurisdiction in this case.2' Yet, the court relied on
22congressional intent. Because legislative history revealed the intent
to reduce diversity jurisdiction, it was illogical to assume that
Congress also intended to expand diversity jurisdiction. 2' As a
result, the court in Saadeh dismissed the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.24
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, follows the plain language
of the permanent-resident-alien amendment, allowing the
amendment to create diversity jurisdiction where it did not
previously exist. After a thorough review of the legislative history,
the court in Singh v. Daimler-Benz, AG 25 agreed that there is nothing
to suggest that Congress intended to expand diversity jurisdiction.26
However, the court found that "there is also nothing to support [the]
view that the entire 1988 Act was characterized by a 'clarity of
17. See Arai v. Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535, 1538, 1541 (D. Haw. 1991)
("Article III requires only minimal diversity .... Therefore, alienage
jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible as long as there is at least one alien
party and at least one state or citizen of a state opposing the alien.").
18. See Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 61.
21. See id. at 60.
22. See id. ("Given the reasoning underlying the recommendation for the
alienage provision and the general expressions of legislative intent for the
Judicial Improvements Act, .. . we conclude that Congress intended to contract
diversity jurisdiction through the 1988 amendment to § 1332(a), not to expand
it by abrogating the longstanding rule that complete diversity is destroyed in
lawsuits between aliens.").
23. Id.
24. See id. at 61.
25. 9 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1993).
26. Id. at 309.
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purpose' to reduce diversity jurisdiction. 27 According to the court
in Singh, the unintended expansion of diversity jurisdiction is "not
sufficient reason for us to torture or limit the statutory language."
28
Moreover, because there was a U.S. citizen on one side and a foreign
citizen on the other, the Article III minimal diversity requirement
was satisfied.
b. current trend in other circuits
Until recently, most district courts had adopted the reasoning of
Saadeh, refusing to use the amendment to expand diversity
jurisdiction in the absence of clear congressional intent to do so.
29
Although such an interpretation would not be unconstitutional in
cases involving at least one U.S. citizen, 30 a plain language
interpretation would surely raise constitutional problems in contexts
involving only foreign citizens.31 Moreover, many courts agree that
following the amendment's plain language would lead to the
problematic conclusion that Congress abandoned the
"longstanding"32 and "well-settled ' 33 rule of complete diversity.34
Thus, several district courts have formed a trend, consistently
viewing a narrow construction of the permanent-resident-alien
provision as the best approach.
However, a recent district court in the Seventh Circuit put an
end to this promising trend. In Cisneros v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Marcus v. "Five J" Jewelers Precious Metals Indus., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); China Nuclear Energy Indus. Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1259-60 (D. Colo. 1998); Lloyds
Bank PLC v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Arai v.
Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535, 1542-43 (D. Haw. 1991). But see Cisneros v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.), 247 F. Supp. 2d
1071, 1075 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
30. See Matsuda v. Wada, 128 F. Supp. 2d 659 (D. Haw. 2000); Banci v.
Wright, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
31. See Arai, 778 F. Supp. at 1543.
32. Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
33. Id. at 61.
34. See Lloyds Bank, 817 F. Supp. at 418. Note that in 1806, the Supreme
Court enunciated the "complete diversity rule," requiring that all the persons
on one side of a controversy are citizens of different states from all the persons
on the other side. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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Inc. (In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.), 35  a foreign citizen
permanently residing in Texas sued two foreign corporations as well
as a U.S. corporation with citizenship in Tennessee and Ohio.
36
Faced with the Saadeh/Singh dichotomy, the court found that the
Third Circuit's opinion in Singh "present[ed] the better-reasoned
analysis. '37  The court added three additional reasons to the
reasoning articulated in Singh. First, the court claimed that those
district courts that follow Saadeh solely involve foreign citizens. 38
This statement is undoubtedly incorrect. Interestingly, the court only
cited one case in support of its contention, 39 conveniently ignoring
the many others that include U.S. citizens as parties.40 Second, the
court claimed that the decision in Saadeh weighed too heavily on the
fact that a plain reading of the amendment would loosen the
complete diversity requirement.4' In making such an argument, the
Bridgestone/Firestone court ignores the fact that courts have
consistently applied the complete diversity rule for almost two
42hundred years. Third, the court argues that § 1332(a)(3) has
already altered the complete diversity requirement with respect to
foreign parties.43 Under that provision, citizens of different states on
opposite sides of litigation will satisfy diversity jurisdiction, despite
the presence of additional foreign parties on both sides. 44 Many
courts, however, agree that Congress intended such a result in order
to provide diverse citizens with a federal forum irrespective of their
involvement with alien parties. 45
35. 247 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
36. See id. at 1072.
37. Id. at 1075.
38. See id. at 1073.
39. Id. (citing Matsuda v. Wada, 128 F. Supp. 2d 659 (D. Haw. 2000)).
40. See, e.g., Marcus v. "Five J" Jewelers Precious Metals Indus., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); China Nuclear Energy Indus. Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1259-60 (D. Colo. 1998); Lloyds
Bank PLC v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Arai v.
Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535, 1542-43 (D. Haw. 1991).
41. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
42. See Norkin, 817 F. Supp. at 418.
43. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
44. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(3) (2000).
45. See Dresser Indus. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 106 F.3d 494,
497 (3d Cir. 1997); K&H Bus. Consultants Ltd. y. Cheltonian, Ltd., 567 F.
Supp. 420, 422-23 (D.N.J. 1983). For an interesting discussion of the
Congressional motivation behind § 1332(a)(3), see Nancy M. Berkley, Note,
Summer 2004] 1413
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Until the Supreme Court addresses this unsettled issue, courts
outside the Third and D.C. Circuits are free to adopt either the Singh
or Saadeh approach. Although suits that are wholly between foreign
parties will undoubtedly lack jurisdiction for constitutional reasons,
those that also include U.S. citizens may satisfy the plain language of
§ 1332. As a result, parties invoking the permanent-resident-alien
provision should attempt to discern whether they are facing a
textualist on the bench.46
2. A note on statelessness
Although § 1332 provides jurisdiction over foreign citizens that
permanently reside in the United States,47 it fails to similarly address
U.S. citizens legally domiciled in a foreign country. U.S. citizens
domiciled abroad are neither citizens of any State in the United
States nor citizens or subjects of a foreign state.48 They are therefore
deemed "stateless," and thus cannot invoke alienage jurisdiction to
access federal courts.49
B. Citizenship of Entities
Before 1958, courts considered a corporation to be a citizen of
only its state of incorporation, presuming that all shareholders were
citizens of the state in which the corporation was chartered. 50 In
Federal Jurisdiction over Suits Between Diverse United States Citizens with
Aliens Joined to Both Sides of the Controversy Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3),
38 RUTGERS L. REv. 71, 94 (1985).
46. For an interesting discussion on the permanent-resident-alien
amendment as Congress's "drafting error," illustrating the clash between the
textualist and contextualist modes of interpretation, see Jonathan R. Siegel,
What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 309 (2001).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
48. See Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Though we are unclear as to Congress's rationale for not granting United
States citizens domiciled abroad rights parallel to those it accords to foreign
nationals, the language of § 1332(a) is specific and requires the conclusion that
a suit by or against United States citizens domiciled abroad may not be
premised on diversity.").
49. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzon-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 899
(1989). For a discussion of the citizenship of unincorporated entities with
stateless members, see discussion infra Part II.B.2.
50. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Sheppard, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 227, 233
(1858).
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reality, shareholder ownership exists beyond the state of
incorporation, and in 1958 Congress added the corporation's
"principal place of business" to the definition of citizenship. 5 1 In
doing so, Congress hoped to prevent local businesses from avoiding
local trials simply because they were incorporated in another state.52
Diversity jurisdiction was originally designed to prevent local bias,
yet it is anomalous to think that a corporation with most of its
activities in a state would not be treated fairly in that state, even if
incorporated in another.53
Section 1332(c)(1) addresses the issue of corporate citizenship,
providing that "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has
its principal place of business. 54 A corporation is not a citizen of
either its state (or states) of incorporation or principal place of
business, but instead is a citizen of both states. This treatment helps
to exclude from diversity jurisdiction cases between a citizen of a
state and a corporation whose principal place of business is in the
same state, even though it may be incorporated elsewhere.
A corporation has only one principal place of business, and
courts use a number of different approaches in their determination.
Some circuits apply the "nerve center" test,55 which determines the
principal place of business by looking to where the management and
policy-making activities take place.56 Under this test, a corporation's
principal place of business is typically in the state where its corporate
headquarters is located.57 Other courts apply the "place of activity"
51. See S. REP. No. 85-1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3099, 3102-03.
52. See id. (explaining that the amendment was designed to remedy "the
evil whereby a local institution, engaged in a local business and in many cases
locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply
because it has obtained a corporate charter from another state"); J.A. Olsen Co.
v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing Senate
Report No. 85-1830).
53. See Tubbs v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 846 F. Supp. 551, 556 (S.D.
Tex. 1994).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
55. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220,
1223 (7th Cir. 1991); Topp v. CompAir Inc., 814 F.2d 830, 834 (1st Cir.
1987); Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
56. See Topp, 814 F.2d at 834.
57. See Metro. Life Ins., 929 F.2d at 1223.
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test, which looks to the center of a corporation's production and
service activities.58 Finally, many courts apply the "total activity"
test, treating it as a hybrid of the first two.59 Courts using this test
typically apply the "nerve center" test when the bulk of activity is
dispersed across several states and apply the "place of activity" test
when the bulk of activity takes place in one state.6 ° Unfortunately,
the language describing each of these tests is imprecise, and their
descriptions often overlap. Nevertheless, courts refer to them in
establishing the controlling rule for each circuit.61
Although each circuit has adopted a particular test or tests to
define a corporation's "principal place of business," it has not as
clearly defined the citizenship of other types of business entities. As
globalization leads our economy in new directions, businesses will
begin to change form. Some will not survive the changes, and this
section will first examine the citizenship of defunct or inactive
corporations. Others will organize as unincorporated entities, and
this section will also discuss the citizenship of partnerships and other
unincorporated associations. Finally, this section will examine
recent developments in the courts' treatment of syndicates, national
banking associations, and state agencies.
1. Citizenship of defunct corporations
Section 1332(c)(1) addresses the citizenship of corporations,62
yet it does not explicate the citizenship of those corporations no
longer conducting active business. Many defunct companies remain
incorporated simply to tie up the loose ends of a concluded business,
which may involve pending litigation.63  Do inactive or defunct
58. See, e.g., Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 549 n.4 (5th Cir.
1992); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960).
59. See, e.g., Bel-Bel Int'l Corp. v. Cmty. Bank of Homestead, 162 F.3d
1101, 1106-07 (11 th Cir. 1998); Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7
F.3d 909, 915 (10th Cir. 1993); Tubbs v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 846 F.
Supp. 551, 553 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
60. See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 162-63 (6th Cir. 1993).
61. For a detailed description of the specific test used in each circuit, see 15
JAMES WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.54 (Daniel R.
Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2003).
63. See, e.g., Circle Indus. USA, Inc. v. Parke Constr. Group, 183 F.3d 105,
107 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing as defunct a corporation that is winding down
business affairs by hiring an attorney to collect various accounts and defend
1416
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corporations 64 still maintain a principal place of business? As
Congress has not expressly provided an answer, this inquiry is left to
the courts; and, there is a significant split of authority regarding the
proper test to apply.
65
a. circuit split regarding principal place of business
The Second Circuit takes the strictest approach. When a
corporation is no longer active, the Second Circuit determines its
citizenship "not only by its state of incorporation, but also by the
place it last transacted business."66 In so holding, the Second Circuit
relies on notions of congressional intent.67  That is, Congress
amended § 1332(c) in order to prevent diversity jurisdiction from
being invoked in areas where corporations had established local
ties.68 By virtue of having engaged in business operations, a defunct
corporation has established a connection with a state, such that it is
litigation); Bonnie & Co. Fashions, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 18 F. Supp. 2d
297, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing as defunct a corporation that is winding
down business affairs by collecting outstanding receivables, reconciling
accounts, and reconciling and paying sales commissions); China Basin Props.,
Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(recognizing as defunct a corporation that is winding down by negotiating an
insurance settlement after a fire destroyed the company's assets).
64. Courts use the terms "defunct" and "inactive" interchangeably to
describe a corporation that at one time engaged in active business, but no
longer does. One court made a distinction between the two, referring to a
defunct corporation as one that "at one time, [conducted] business," and an
inactive corporation as one that has never conducted any business. Allendale,
818 F. Supp. at 1304. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693,
696 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) (defining an "inactive" corporation as one that has
"ceased any and all business activities"); Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961
F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a corporation that has not been
active for five years is inactive, rather than defunct).
65. See Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696-97 (discussing different approaches used
by the Second and Fifth Circuits).
66. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933
F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991); see Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat'l
Corp., 101 F.3d 900, 907 (2d Cir. 1996).
67. Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc., 933 F.2d at 141 ("To allow inactive
corporations to avoid inquiry into where they were last active would give them
a benefit Congress never planned for them, since under such a rule a defunct
corporation, no matter how local in character, could remove a case to federal
court based on its state of incorporation.").
68. China Basin Props., Ltd. v. One Pass, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038, 1040
(N.D. Cal. 1993).
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not at risk of local prejudice.69 As the Senate Report accompanying
the amendment noted, "It appears neither fair nor proper for such a
corporation to avoid trial in the State where it has its principal place
of business by resorting to a legal device not available to the
individual citizen. 7 °
Although the Second Circuit recognizes the state in which a
defunct corporation last transacted business, it does not specifically
address what constitutes a business transaction. One court, however,
suggested that a business transaction for a defunct corporation is one
that "goes toward the furtherance of the corporation." 71 Transactions
to "wind down" the business affairs of a company will usually not
suffice.72 For example, the Second Circuit held in Circle Industries
USA, Inc. v. Parke Construction Group, Inc.7 3 that a corporation was
not transacting business in New York when it hired an attorney to
collect accounts in Georgia and defend litigation in New York,
despite the fact that the sole officer and director lived in New York
and received corporate mail there.74 Participation in lawsuits had not
69. See Allendale, 818 F. Supp. at 1304 ("[A] defunct corporation ... is not
at risk of being an 'alien' in state court."); One Pass, 812 F. Supp. at 1040
("[A] corporation which, when active, had its principal place of business in
California, is unlikely to suffer local prejudice in California state courts.").
70. S. REP. No. 85-1830 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099,
3102.
71. Bonnie & Co. Fashions v. Bankers Trust Co., 18 F. Supp. 2d 297, 303
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (interpreting dicta from Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v.
Leucadia Nat'l Corp., 101 F.3d 900, 907 n.5 (2d Cir. 1996)).
72. See, e.g., id. at 303 (collecting outstanding receivables, reconciling
accounts, and reconciling and paying sales commissions were considered "a
winding down of affairs" and not business transactions for purposes of
determining the inactive corporation's principal place of business); Allendale,
818 F. Supp. at 1305 (winding down activities consisting of insurance
settlement negotiations for a defunct corporation whose assets were destroyed
in a fire did not constitute a business transaction). But see Athena Auto., Inc.
v. Digregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[A] corporation's winding
up of its business affairs may well constitute a significant activity. .. .");
Comtec, Inc. v. Nat'l Tech. Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 524 n.3 (D. Ariz. 1989)
("When a corporation is winding down, there is an argument to be made that
its principal place of business is the state from which the corporation is making
its final decisions.").
73. 183 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1999).
74. See id.
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been the corporation's purpose when active, and therefore did not
qualify as "transacting business" for jurisdictional purposes.
75
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, adopted the view that an
inactive corporation has no principal place of business and,
accordingly, is only a citizen of its state of incorporation.76
According to the court in Midlantic National Bank v. Hansen, the
plain meaning of § 1332(c) gives a corporation citizenship in the
state where it has its principal place of business, not where it has had
its business in the past.77 While the court recognizes that this rule
might conflict with congressional intent,78 the court believes that "the
benefits of certainty and clarity which obtain from the 'bright line'
approach" outweigh the potential for harm.79 The court adds that
Congress never intended for courts to "strain to locate a principal
place of business when no such place in reality exists."
80
The Third Circuit's relaxed approach to finding diversity of
citizenship for defunct corporations was recently developed further
in Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. HE.
Lockhart Management, Inc.81 In that case, the court considered
whether a corporation's affmnative acts to maintain its ability to
conduct future business in a state, such as paying franchise taxes and
filing corporate reports, are sufficient to make that state its principal
place of business. 82 The court held that they are not, because a
corporation must actually conduct business in a state for it to have a
principal place of business there.83  According to the court, a
corporation that is merely qualified to conduct business in a state, but
does not actually do so, is in the same position as a foreign
75. See id.
76. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995);
Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483,486-87 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
77. Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698.
78. See Wm. Passalcqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933
F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991) ("To allow inactive corporations to avoid inquiry
into where they were last active would give them a benefit Congress never
planned for them, since under such rule a defunct corporation, no matter how
local in character, could remove a case to federal court based on its state of
incorporation.").
79. Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698.
80. Id.
81. 316 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2003).
82. Id. at 410.
83. Id. at411.
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corporation and should similarly receive the protection provided in
federal court.84 This new holding makes the Third Circuit's "bright-
line" rule even brighter, and a defunct corporation's likelihood of
being a diverse party even greater.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a middle ground approach,
analyzing the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the
citizenship of inactive corporations.85 The amount of time that a
corporation has been inactive is important. If a corporation has been
inactive for a "substantial period of time," it is a citizen only of its
state of incorporation. 86 On the other hand, if a corporation has not
been inactive for a substantial period of time, "the place of [its] last
business activity is relevant to determine its principal place of
business, [but] not dispositive.' 87 The court in Harris v. Black
Clawson Co. rejects the Second Circuit's less flexible approach,
indicating its potential for finding a corporation's principal place of
business in a state where it may not have been a citizen when
active.88  In other words, it is possible that a corporation's last
business activity could take place in a state other than its last
principal place of business. "Surely Congress cannot have intended
to produce this result either." 89 The Fourth Circuit agrees and has
adopted a "facts and circumstances" approach similar to that of the
Fifth Circuit.
90
b. current trend in other circuits
Most other circuits take the approach that limits diversity
jurisdiction. 9' By recognizing a defunct corporation as a citizen of
84. Id. at 412.
85. See Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992).
86. Id. Although the court does not clarify the meaning of "substantial," it
considered five years to be substantial. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Athena Auto., Inc. v. Digregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 1999)
(reasoning that a corporation who conducts no business for approximately
three years is "just the type of out-of-state citizen for whom Congress sought to
provide a federal forum by creating diversity jurisdiction").
91. See, e.g., Flynn v. Teak Associated Invs. #2, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1081
(D.D.C. 2000); Caribbean Mushroom Co., Inc. v. Gov't Dev. Bank for P.R.,
980 F. Supp. 620 (D.P.R. 1997); China Basin Props., Ltd. v. One Pass, Inc.,
812 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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the state where it had its last business activity, courts make it more
difficult for such corporations to be diverse parties. Those in support
of this trend argue that it comports more closely with (1) the plain
meaning of § 1332(c), (2) its legislative history, and (3)
congressional intent.
First, courts highlight that § 1332(c) states that corporate
diversity is determined both by a corporation's place of incorporation
and its principal place of business. By using the conjunction "and,"
courts imply that Congress intended all elements to be met before
diversity jurisdiction would attach.92  Therefore, a court that
recognizes only a corporation's state of incorporation for diversity
purposes "disregards one element that is a prerequisite to diversity
jurisdiction.,
93
Second, courts hold that the legislative history of the 1958
amendment to § 1332 makes it clear that Congress added the
"principal place of business" requirement to limit corporate
diversity.94 Legislatures became concerned about the ease with
which corporations removed cases to federal court based solely on
their places of incorporation.95 A district court in the First Circuit
agreed with the Second Circuit's restrictive approach, arguing that
the limitation of a defunct corporation's citizenship to only its state
of incorporation "flies in the face of Congress' intent."
96
Finally, courts look to Congress's original purpose for
establishing diversity jurisdiction: to protect out-of-state litigants
from local prejudice in state courts by providing a neutral, federal
forum.97  A corporation that once conducted business in a state
92. See One Pass, 812 F. Supp. at 1040.
93. Comtec, Inc. v. Nat'l Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D. Ariz.
1989). But see Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir.
1995) (rejecting the notion that implicit in the statute's terms is the
requirement that all corporations be deemed to have a principal place of
business, since corporations that never conducted any business would use only
its state of incorporation to determine citizenship).
94. See Comtec, 711 F. Supp. at 523 ("The debate... centered around the
perceived evil of allowing an essentially local corporation to remove a case to
federal court simply because the corporate charter was obtained in another
state.").
95. See S. REP. No. 85-1830 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099,
3101-02.
96. Caribbean Mushroom Co., 980 F. Supp. at 625.
97. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945).
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established a connection with that state such that it will not suffer
local prejudice.98 Therefore, a defunct corporation can receive a fair
hearing in state court and does not need the protection of § 1332.
In conclusion, outside the Third Circuit, a corporation will likely
have at least two states of citizenship. This recent trend makes
corporate access to federal court through diversity more difficult.
Even though Congress did not explicitly address the citizenship of
inactive or defunct corporations, courts have relied on congressional
intent to limit a corporation's ability to invoke diversity jurisdiction.
2. Citizenship of partnerships
While § 1332(c) provides an express rule for determining the
citizenship of corporations, no statutory authority provides such a
rule for partnerships or other non-corporate entities. As a result,
courts consider "all the members" of a partnership in determining
whether diversity jurisdiction exists.99 The more members, the more
likely it is that one of them will defeat the complete diversity
requirement of Strawbridge.'00
The Supreme Court in Carden v. Arkoma Associates1 °' extended
this rule to limited partnerships, holding that the citizenship of all
partners, not simply general partners, determines whether there is
complete diversity. 102 An increasing number of organizations today
are organizing in various forms of unincorporated associations.
0 3
As a result, courts in recent cases have applied the Carden rule to
98. See China Basin Props., Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp.
1301, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
99. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889).
100. See supra note 34.
101. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
102. See id. at 195.
103. See Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional Approach to Collapsing Corporate
Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 389, 397 (2003). For a discussion of the
increasing number of cases involving LLCs and diversity of citizenship, see
Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited Liability Companies for Diversity
Jurisdiction, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 435 (2002). See also Susan
Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 403-05 (1996)
(discussing the rise of the LLC and its effect on tax law).
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other complex partnerships, such as LLCs,' °4 LLPs,10 5 partnerships
of multi-tiers, l°6and labor unions. 1
07
Some courts and commentators argue that corporations and
unincorporated associations are "indistinguishable... in terms of the
reality of function and structure,"' 10 8 and thus justify a uniform
rule. 109 According to other courts, these arguments, although well-
founded, are better aimed at the legislature." 0 Therefore, most
courts today remain unwilling to extend corporate treatment to
entities not formally incorporated."'
104. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998);
Halleran v. Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 48 (lst Cir. 1992); Sonoma Falls
Developers, LLC v. Nev. Gold & Casinos, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 919, 922
(N.D. Cal. 2003); JMTR Enters., LLC v. Duchin, 42 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D.
Mass. 1999); Int'l Flavors & Textures, LLC v. Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552,
554-55 (W.D. Mich. 1997). But see Carlos v. Adamany, No. 95 C 50,264,
1996 WL 210,019, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1996) (suggesting in dicta that an
LLC's citizenship be the state of its principal place of business).
105. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kurtzman, 45 F. Supp. 2d 423, 433 (D.N.J. 1999);
Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. Pickett, 11 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 965 F. Supp. 165,
176 (D. Mass. 1997).
106. See, e.g., Cerebus Partners v. Gadsby & Hannah, 976 F. Supp. 119 (D.
R.I. 1997).
107. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
147(1965).
108. Id. at 150.
109. For an excellent discussion of the blurred distinctions between
incorporated and unincorporated entities and the necessity for a uniform rule to
determine citizenship, see Oh, supra note 103.
110. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197 (1990) ("Which of[a
partnership's members] is entitled to be considered a 'citizen' for diversity
purposes, and which of their members' citizenship is to be consulted, are
questions more readily resolved by legislative prescription than by legal
reasoning... . [W]e will leave the rest to Congress."); Bouligny, 382 U.S. at
150-51 ("We are of the view that... pleas for extension of the diversity
jurisdiction to hitherto uncovered broad categories of litigants ought to be
made to the Congress and not to the courts.").
111. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 197. Note that the Supreme Court has
recognized a sole exception for the Puerto Rican entity called "sociedad en
comandita," treating such an entity as a corporation for diversity purposes.
Puerto Rico v. Russel & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933) (holding that the
entity's juridical personality is "so complete in contemplation of the law of
Puerto Rico" that it could find no adequate reason to give the sociedad a
different status for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation
organized under that law).
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As noted earlier, a U.S. citizen domiciled abroad is treated, for
diversity purposes, as being neither a citizen of any state nor a citizen
or subject of a foreign state.' 12 Accordingly, when such a party is a
member of a partnership or other unincorporated association, she
renders the entity "stateless" for diversity purposes. Consequently,
the entire entity becomes incapable of invoking alienage jurisdiction
to litigate in federal court.
Recently, the Second Circuit has applied this rule to large law
firms. 113 Many of the large U.S. law firms operating today have
embraced globalization, setting up foreign branches and sending
partners to work abroad. Even a single U.S. partner domiciled in a
foreign country will deem the entire firm "stateless."'1 14 It follows,
therefore, that by employing stateless members, an unincorporated
entity may attempt to avoid litigation in federal court.'
15
3. Citizenship of syndicates
Lloyd's of London operates as a marketplace where investors,
called "names," form unincorporated groups, or "syndicates.""
6
These syndicates underwrite insurance coverage through agents,
known as "underwriters. ' 17 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
whose citizenship counts: that of the underwriters or the individual
names? Courts of appeals are split on the issue." 
8
112. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
113. See, e.g., Herrick Co., Inc. v. SCS Communications, Inc., 251 F.3d 315,
322-23 (2d Cir. 2001); Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1990).
114. See Herrick, 251 F.3d at 322.
115. Note, however, that an opposing litigant may still invoke § 1331 to
satisfy subject matter jurisdiction. For a possible way to resolve the "anomaly
of statelessness," see Oh, supra note 103, at 462-64.
116. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London, Eng. v. Layne,
26 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994).
117. See id. For a more detailed description of the London insurance market,
see Edinburgh Assurance Co. v. R.L. Bums Corp., 479 F. Supp. 138, 144-46
(C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 669 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir.
1982).
118. For a more detailed discussion of the complexity involved in the
various circuits' analyses of syndicate citizenship for diversity purposes, see
Howard M. Tollin & Mark Deckman, Lloyd's of London and the Problem with
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 289 (2000).
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a. circuit split regarding syndicate citizenship
The Sixth Circuit represents the minority view, recognizing only
the citizenship of the lead underwriter for purposes of establishing
diversity jurisdiction. In Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, England v. Layne, 19 the Sixth Circuit analogized the lead
underwriter to a trustee who is liable on the contract. 120  Because
underwriters write the insurance, process the claims, and make
litigation decisions, they are the real parties in interest, 121 and it is
their citizenship that counts. 1
22
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, rejected this approach in
Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Insurance Co. 123 The court explained that
underwriters at Lloyd's are treated as agents of the syndicates, rather
than trustees, because underwriters do not "own the corpus.',
124
Instead, underwriters merely manage the names' assets. 125  If the
underwriters were treated as trustees, "any unincorporated
association could avoid [the complete diversity requirement] by
naming an agent or attorney to act on behalf of all members."'
126
Instead, the Seventh Circuit, along with the Fifth, considers the
citizenship of all names within a syndicate for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, 127 and thus recognizes syndicate members as the real
parties in interest. This reasoning is consistent with the fact that the
insurance contract is between the policyholder and each individual
name, rather than the syndicate or underwriter. 28 More importantly,
all of Lloyd's members face unlimited personal liability, making the
119. 26 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994).
120. See id. at 43; see also Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980)
(holding that trustees were entitled to sue in their own right and thus were the
real parties in interest).
121. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) requires that "[e]very action...
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a)
(emphasis added).
122. See Layne, 26 F.3d at 43-44.
123. 141 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998).
124. Id. at 318.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., id.; Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 3 F.3d
877 (5th Cir. 1993).
128. See Int'l Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 88 C
9838, 1991 WL 693,319, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1991).
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syndicate much like a partnership. 29 The court in Indiana Gas Co.
explained, "An underwriting syndicate at Lloyd's has the personal-
liability characteristics of a general partnership and the management
structure of a limited partnership."'130 As a result, the court followed
Carden and held that syndicates, just like other unincorporated
associations, have the citizenships of every member. 131
The Second and Third Circuits present yet another approach to
the determination of syndicate citizenship. In E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Co., 132 the Second Circuit
held that when the lead underwriter is sued as a representative of the
syndicate, courts should consider the citizenship of all the
syndicate's names; 133 however, when the lead underwriter is sued in
an individual capacity, only the underwriter's citizenship determines
federal diversity jurisdiction.134 In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,135 the Third Circuit similarly
held that the citizenship of a lead underwriter sued in his individual
capacity is sufficient to determine diversity.136 The fact that many
syndicate policies contractually bind each of the names to any
judgments rendered against any name does not require courts to
consider the citizenship of unspecified names not before the court,
provided that the name sued is in the litigation as an individual,
rather than as a representative.
b. current trend in other circuits
District courts sitting in both the First and Ninth Circuits follow
the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, which has become the modem
trend.' 37 This trend is yet another that restricts diversity jurisdiction,
129. See Ind. Gas Co., 141 F.3d at 316.
130. Id. at 317. The court rejected the argument that a syndicate is more like
a trust because the names participate for their own interest. Id.
131. Id.
132. 160 F.3d 925 (2d Cir. 1998).
133. Id. at 939.
134. Id.
135. 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999).
136. Id. at 223. The court noted that even a side agreement regarding the
liability between the underwriter and the names did not deprive the court of
jurisdiction. Id.
137. See, e.g., Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Inst. of
London Underwriters, 870 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1994); Queen Victoria Corp. v.
Ins. Specialists of Haw., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 553 (D. Haw. 1989).
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for it is likely, given the nature of Lloyd's syndicates, that there will
be a name who is not diverse from the adverse party.
4. Citizenship of national banking associations
A national bank is organized under federal law pursuant to the
National Banking Act.' 38 As a result, national banks have no state of
incorporation, and Congress enacted a statute to specifically address
their citizenship.' 3 9  According to Section 1348, "[a]ll national
banking associations shall.., be deemed citizens of the States in
which they are respectively located., 140 The statute, however, fails
to clarify the meaning of "located," and the issue has become more
complex as banks have opened numerous branches across the United
States. Once again, the interpretations are split three ways.
14 1
a. circuit split regarding national bank citizenship
The Ninth Circuit was the first to address this issue, holding in
1943 that a national bank is located in the state where it maintains its
principal place of business. 142 A district court sitting in the First
Circuit began a new trend in Connecticut National Bank v. Iacono,
14 3
recognizing that a national bank is a citizen of every state in which it
maintains a branch office. 144 The overwhelming majority of federal
138. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 22-24 (2000).
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000).
140. Id.
141. See Evergreen Forest Prods. of Ga., L.L.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 262
F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1301-02 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (comparing and contrasting
Ninth, First, and Seventh Circuit analyses of the citizenship of a national bank
and ultimately adopting a variation of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning).
142. See Am. Sur. Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.2d 160, 161-62 (9th Cir.
1943).
143. 785 F. Supp. 30 (D.R.I. 1992).
144. Id. at 33.
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courts followed this interpretation, 145 addressing the need to "relieve
the congestion of federal courts."'
146
The Seventh Circuit recently introduced a third approach in
Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul,14 7 holding that a national bank is located
in both the state of its principal place of business and the state listed
in its organizational certificate. 48  Before rejecting the approach
established in Iacono and forming its own interpretation of Section
1343, the court recounted the history of jurisdiction over national
banks. 149 Federally chartered banks originally could invoke federal
question jurisdiction to bring a case into federal court since a suit by
or against it was one arising under the laws of the United States."
0
In 1882, Congress rejected that idea in an attempt "to place national
banks on the same footing as banks of the state where they were
located .... "' After several amendments aimed at preserving the
"jurisdictional parity" between national banks and state corporations,
Congress enacted the current version of Section 1348. 152 A state
bank, which is organized under state corporate law, is a citizen of
both its state of incorporation and of its principal place of
business. 1 3 According to the Firstar court, a court can achieve
parity by similarly recognizing a national bank as a citizen of both
the state listed in its organizational certificate and the state of its
145. See, e.g., First Union Corp. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 222 F.
Supp. 2d 767, 770 (W.D.N.C. 2001); Frontier Ins. Co. v. MTN Owner Trust,
111 F. Supp. 2d 376, 376-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 340, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Ferraiolo Constr., Inc. v. Keybank, N.A.,
978 F. Supp. 23, 24 (D. Me. 1997); Norwest Bank of Minn., N.A. v. Patton,
924 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D. Colo. 1996); Bank of N.Y. v. Bank of Am., 861 F.
Supp. 225, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). But see Fin. Software Sys., Inc. v. First
Union Nat'l Bank, 84 F. Supp. 2d 594, 602 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
146. BankofN.Y., 861 F. Supp. at 230.
147. 253 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2001).
148. Id. at 994.
149. See id. at 988-89.
150. Leather Mfrs.' Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 781 (1887).
151. Id. at 780; see Petri v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Chi., 142 U.S. 644,
649 (1892) (explaining that after the 1882 amendment, "the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Courts over suits by or against national banks could no longer be
asserted on the ground of their Federal origin, as they were placed in the same
category with banks not organized under the laws of the United States").
152. See Firstar, 253 F.3d at 985-86 (presuming that Congress enacted §
1348 in light of this legislative background).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2000).
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principal place of business. 5 4  Since the Firstar decision, most
courts have construed the citizenship of national banks in this
manner. 1
55
b. current trend in other circuits
A significant development in the area of national bank
citizenship recently emerged from a district court in Alabama. In
Evergreen Forest Products of Georgia, L.L. C. v. Bank of America,
N.A., 56 the court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a
national bank is a citizen of the state where it maintains its principal
place of business. 157 However, the court in Evergreen believes that
the state listed in a national bank's most recent articles of
association, rather than its organizational certificate, more accurately
reflects its true location. 58 The defendant in Evergreen, Bank of
America, merged with NationsBank and moved its operations from
California to North Carolina. 159 A bank that relocates its main office
must amend the articles of association,' 60 but it need not change the
original organizational certificate. 61  After the move, Bank of
America's organizational certificate inaccurately reflected its
citizenship for purposes of diversity, which indicated "a flaw in
Firstar's reasoning."' 162 Therefore, the court held that a national
bank's citizenship should be determined by the state of its principal
154. Firstar, 253 F.3d at 993-94 (reasoning that the organizational
certificate, which requires a bank to disclose the place where its 'operations of
discount and deposit are to be carried on' would serve as an appropriate
substitute (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 22 (2000))).
155. See, e.g., Pitts v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 217 F. Supp. 2d 629, 630-31
(D. Md. 2002); Bank One, N.A. v. Euro-Alamo, Invs., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d
808, 810 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Johnson, 186 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1183-84 (W.D. Okla. 2001).
156. 262 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
157. Id. at 1303.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1305. Bank of America's organizational certificate indicated its
location in California. Id. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 30(b), a national bank may
move its location. Evergreen Forest Prods., 262 F.Supp. at 1306 n. 13.
160. 12 C.F.R. § 5.40(d)(2)(ii) (2004).
161. See Evergeen Forest Prods., 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
162. Id. at 1307 ("[A]pplication of Firstar [to situations in which banks
relocate] could result in national banks being deemed citizens of states where
they no longer maintain significant contacts.").
Summer 2004] 1429
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1407
place of business and the state listed in its most recent articles of
association.
1 63
Perhaps it is premature to determine whether the majority of
courts will change their interpretation of Section 1348 to that
established in Evergreen. However, one district court in the Fifth
Circuit has already done so, 164 following Evergreen with no
explanation other than that it "presents a better interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1348. ' '165 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has yet to
reach a consensus on the issue, analyzing Section 1348 inconsistently
in various recent opinions.1
66
5. Citizenship of states and state agencies
Section 1332 provides federal jurisdiction for actions between
citizens of different states, 167 and it is a basic principle of law that a
state is not a citizen for purposes of diversity. Thus, if a party is
not a citizen of any state, diversity of citizenship will not exist.
169
The Supreme Court in Moor v. Alameda County further explained
that "a political subdivision of a State, unless it is simply 'the arm or
alter ego of the State,' is a citizen of the State for diversity
163. See id.
164. See Bank One, N.A. v. Shreeji A&M, Inc., No. CA 3:02-CV-1555-R,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10,994, *4-7 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
165. Id. at *6.
166. Compare World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345
F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Defendant ... is a national bank ... and by
statute is deemed to be a citizen of every state in which it has offices."), and
United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d
168, 169 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (remanding to district court to determine
whether diversity jurisdiction existed in light of fact that defendant had branch
offices in plaintiff's home state), with Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d
113, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2003) (assuming that the national bank was a citizen of
New York, presumably its principal place of business, for diversity purposes).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2003).
168. See Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) (stating that a
state cannot be a "'citizen' [of itself] for purposes of the diversity
jurisdiction"); U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D. Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 499 (1st
Cir. 2000); JMB Group Trust IV v. Pa. Mun. Ret. Sys., 986 F. Supp. 534, 536
(N.D. 11. 1997).
169. See Batton v. Ga. Gulf, 261 F. Supp. 2d 575, 583 (M.D. La. 2003)
(rejecting the argument that only a party who shares citizenship with a party
"across the 'v"' destroys diversity).
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purposes., 170 Therefore, an agency or political subdivision must be
separate and distinct from the state in order to be deemed a citizen.
The First Circuit notes that public and private corporations are
usually regarded as "citizens," where most unincorporated state
agencies and departments are recognized as arms of the State.
17 1
State law determines the test for whether a political subdivision
is the "alter ego" of the state. 172 This test is the same as that used to
determine Eleventh Amendment immunity. 173  Courts primarily
weigh two factors: "(1) the extent of control exercised over the
entity by the state, and (2) whether the entity has a role which is
completely defined by the state, i.e., whether it acts as an agent of the
state.' ' 174  Previously, Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis
turned on whether a judgment against the entity would be paid out of
the state treasury. 175  The Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
176
however, held that the financial effect on a state's treasury is
170. Moor, 411 U.S. at 717 (quoting State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr.
Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199 (1929)); see Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Verex Assurance, Inc., 68 F.3d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that state
agencies that are the alter ego of the state are not citizens for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction); JMB Group Trust, 986 F. Supp. at 536-37 (finding it
"well-settled" law that political subdivisions of a state are citizens unless arms
or alter egos of that state).
171. Univ. of R.I. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200, 1203-04 (1st Cir.
1993); see, e.g., Nevada v. Pioneer Cos., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 (D. Nev.
2003) (recognizing the Colorado River Commission of Nevada (CRCN) as an
arm of the state where CRCN explicitly refers to itself as an agent of Nevada
in pleadings and where legislation regarding the powers and duties of the
commission repeatedly refer to CRCN as an agent of Nevada); JMB Group
Trust, 986 F. Supp. at 536-37 (recognizing a pension fund system providing
retirement benefits for municipal employees as a state agency of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and thus, an arm of the state).
172. See Moor, 411 U.S. at 717; Ind. Port Comm'n v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 702 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Adden v. J.D.
Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (7th Cir. 1982) (using Louisiana law to
determine that the Department of Corrections performed a normal government
function).
173. See JMB Group Trust, 986 F. Supp. at 537 (applying the same test to
determine diversity jurisdiction and Eleventh Amendment immunity).
174. Id.; see also Crosetto v. State Bar, 12 F.3d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1993).
175. See Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1982).
176. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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irrelevant if other factors weigh in favor of finding that the entity is
an agent or alter ego of the state.
77
Recently, courts have addressed the citizenship of states and
state agencies in a few new contexts. For example, section 1332
provides that the word "States" includes territories of the United
States.'78 As a result, the Ninth Circuit recently determined that
because the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands is a U.S.
territory, it is a state and thus not a citizen for purposes of
diversity.
179
The Second Circuit in World Trade Center Properties, L.L.C. v.
Hartford Fire Insurance. Co.' 80 addressed whether the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey was "so closely aligned with
the two state governments that created it to foreclose its being treated
as a citizen ... for diversity purposes."' 81  The court noted that
although the issue was one of first impression in the circuit, existing
case law established that the Port Authority is not entitled to
sovereign immunity. 182 Therefore, without any inquiry into the Port
Authority's level of autonomy, the court held that the Port Authority
must be an independent political subdivision and a citizen of both
New York and New Jersey.
183
Not surprisingly, many recent district court decisions regarding
political subdivisions have continued to limit diversity by
recognizing various entities as arms of their respective states. For
example, recent courts have added a state university,184 a health
177. Id. at 58; see also Thiel v. State Bar, 94 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1996);
JMB Group Trust, 986 F. Supp. at 538 ("Because... [defendant] is indeed
subject to the direction and control of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to a
great degree, and.., acts as agent of the Commonwealth in performing its
duties, the court need not address whether a judgment against the [defendant]
would have an effect upon the Pennsylvania State Treasury.").
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2000).
179. See Dyack v. North Mariana Islands, 317 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir.
2003).
180. 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
181. Id. at 162.
182. Id.; See Japan Airlines Co. v. Port Auth., 178 F.3d 103, 110-12 (2d Cir.
1999) (denying sovereign immunity to the Port Authority); Feeney v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying
sovereign immunity to the Port Authority).
183. See World Trade Ctr. Props. 345 F.3d at 162.
184. See Llewellyn-Waters v. Univ. of P.R., 56 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (D.P.R.
1999).
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department,' s5 a pension fund system,' 8 6 and a subsidiary of a
tourism promotion company' 87 to the list of agents or arms of a state.
Note, however, that most courts agree that school districts are not
arms of a state and therefore are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.' s8 Accordingly, a recent district court decision held that,
for diversity purposes, a school district in Mississippi is a citizen of
that state.'
89
C. Jurisdictional Amount in Controversy
In addition to satisfying citizenship requirements, diversity
actions must also exceed the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs. 190 Although Congress originally set the threshold
at $500,191 it has continued to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts
by periodically increasing the amount.' 92  Because Congress
intended to "stem the tide of diversity litigation in the federal
185. See Batton v. Ga. Gulf, 261 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581 (M.D. La. 2003).
186. See JMB Group Trust IV v. Pa. Mun. Ret. Sys., 986 F. Supp. 534, 538
(N.D. 11. 1997).
187. See CBR Holdings v. Hotel Dev. Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 131, 138
(D.P.R. 2002).
188. See, e.g., Cuesta v. Sch. Bd., 285 F.3d 962, 966 (11 th Cir. 2002); Cash
v. Granville County Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2001); Duke v. Grady
Mun. Sch., 127 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 1997); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865,
870-71 (3d Cir. 1990). But see Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963
F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992).
189. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 223 F. Supp. 2d 771,
777-78 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (finding that a school district is not the alter ego of
the state because it can contract in its own name, sue in its own name, own and
lease property, is primarily concerned with local rather than state problems,
and has been sued by the state in state court in the past).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). Congress originally imposed a similar amount
in controversy requirement for federal question cases, but dropped it in 1980.
See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, sec. 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, 2369
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
191. See Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, §
11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
192. Congress raised the requirement to $2,000 in 1887, see Act of March 3,
1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552, to $3,000 in 1911, see Act of March 3, 1911,
ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, to $10,000 in 1958, see Act of July 25,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, sec. 2, § 1332(a), 72 Stat. 415, 415, to $50,000 in
1988, see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 100-702,
sec. 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988), and to the current $75,000 minimum
in 1996, see Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, sec.
205(a), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850.
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courts,, 193 judges have a responsibility "to police the border of
federal jurisdiction."' 194 On the other hand, an extensive fact-finding
inquiry may be too time consuming and may force a plaintiff to put
on the damages portion of her case before discovery even begins.
195
Recognizing these conflicting interests, courts apply the "legal
certainty" test established in 1938 in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.
v. Red Cab Co. 196 The party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction
must allege that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory
minimum. 97  A good faith assertion that the action satisfies the
requirement is generally sufficient; 198 however, when such an
assertion is challenged, the party asserting jurisdiction must show
that it is not a "legal certainty" that the claim involves less than the
jurisdictional amount. 199 A party may meet this burden by either
193. Rosenboro v. Kim, 994 F.2d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see H.R. REP. No.
100-889, at 45 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6005.
194. Speilman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001). If not raised
by either party, the issue of amount in controversy may be raised at any time
by the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see, e.g., Matheson v. Progressive
Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding an action
for determination of diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff only sought "in
excess" of $30,000 without explaining how much "in excess" and where the
record failed to show that the district court determined that the amount in
controversy was met).
195. See Speilman, 251 F.3d at 8 ("[D]etermining whether a case belongs in
federal court should be done quickly, without an extensive fact-finding
inquiry."); see also Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60
F.3d 350, 352 (7th Cir. 1995) ("To make the 'which court' decision
expeditiously and cheaply, a judge must simplify the inquiry...
196. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief.., shall contain.., a short and plain statement of the grounds upon
which the court's jurisdiction depends."); see also Iglesias v. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 156 F.3d 237, 243 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction where defendant failed to allege that the counterclaim satisfied the
amount in controversy requirement and where the record lacked "facts...
indicative that this [was] so").
198. See Dep't of Recreation & Sports v. World Boxing Ass'n, 942 F.2d 84,
88 (1st Cir. 1991).
199. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co, 303 U.S. at 289 (1938); see also
Speilman, 251 F.3d at 5 ("Once the damages allegation is challenged, however,
'the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of alleging with
sufficient particularity facts indicating that it is not a legal certainty that the
claim involves less than the jurisdictional amount."') (quoting Dep't of
Recreation & Sports, 942 F.2d at 88).
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amending the pleadings or submitting affidavits. 20 0 It is important to
note that courts "look[] to the circumstances at the time the
complaint is filed,' 20' and subsequent events that reduce the amount
in controversy below the minimum do not divest the federal court of
jurisdiction.20 2
An example of an amount in controversy claim that fails to meet
the "legal certainty" test is one that involves a damages cap
(provided in either a statute or a contract) at an amount below the
jurisdictional minimum.20 3 For example, in Pratt Central Park Ltd.
Partnership v. Dames & Moore, Inc.,204 Judge Easterbrook dismissed
a case where a contract clause capped liability at $5,000.205 The
plaintiff argued that his assent to the cap was an issue of material fact
to be resolved by the jury.20 6 As Judge Easterbrook responded, "Yet
many contract cases can be and are decided on the papers. 20 7 He
emphasized the conflict between easy access to federal courts, which
would reduce the "heightened cost of jurisdictional inquiry at the
outset of the case, 20 8 and strict enforcement of jurisdictional limits
in marginal cases, which would "protect... [those] litigants whose
claims are squarely within federal jurisdiction., 20 9 Although such
conflicts rarely yield to bright-line tests, a district judge may dismiss
a case if a contract holds damages below the jurisdictional amount.
Judge Easterbrook's decision in Pratt exemplifies the Seventh
200. Dep "t of Recreation and Sports, 942 F.2d at 88.
201. Coventry Sewage Assoc. v. Dworkin Realty Co., 71 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1995).
202. Id. at 4-7 (distinguishing "subsequent events"-such as defendant's
partial payment of a claim-which will not affect a court's jurisdiction, from
"subsequent revelations" as to the actual amount at the commencement of the
suit-such as plaintiff's realization that she made an error in her original
calculation-which will affect the court's jurisdiction if plaintiff lacked good
faith); Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000).
203. See Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, 60 F.3d 350, 353
(7th Cir. 1995) (citing cases that involve damages caps).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 355.
206. Id. at 353.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 351 ("A judge would need to conduct proceedings, potentially
complex, to determine whether the claim had sufficient substance to meet the
jurisdictional requirements.").
209. Id. at 352.
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Circuit's adherence to Congress's intent to restrict diversity
jurisdiction.1 °
1. Aggregation of punitive damages
Contractual damages caps may not bar federal jurisdiction if a
suit also seeks punitive damages.2 1 In some circumstances, punitive
and actual damages may be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional
amount in controversy. 212 The court must ask (1) whether punitive
damages are recoverable as a matter of law and (2) whether recovery
is precluded because the plaintiff cannot, beyond a legal certainty,
recover the jurisdictional amount under any circumstances.
213
The first question seems to be a simple one, yet the Seventh
Circuit has recently taken a rather strict approach to the inquiry.
Recently, in American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida
v. Evans,214 the court declared that simply pointing to the availability
of punitive damages is insufficient to sustain the burden of proof.
215
After Evans filed suit in an Illinois court, American responded by
petitioning a federal court to compel Evans to arbitration.2 16 The
Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction,217 indicating that American offered no evidence tending
to show that its conduct was "outrageous. ' '1 8  Instead, American
210. Note that the Seventh Circuit has also found dismissal proper when
state law limits a claim to an amount less than the jurisdictional minimum. See
Ind. Hi-Rail Corp. v. Decatur Junction Ry., 37 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 1994)
(determining that state law limited damages in a conversion case to nominal
damages if property was returned).
211. See Normand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 193 F.3d 908, 910-11
(7th Cir. 1999).
212. Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc'y of Montgomery, Ala., 320 U.S. 238,
240 (1943).
213. See Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2000); see
also Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that plaintiffs had no right under Pennsylvania law to recover punitive
damages).
214. 319 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2003).
215. Id. at 909.
216. Id. at 908.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 909. Outrageous conduct is a requirement for punitive awards
under the Consumer Fraud Act. See Ekl v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156, 244 (Ill.
1991).
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merely pointed to the theoretical availability of certain categories of
damages, which the Seventh Circuit held is "not enough.
219
The Seventh Circuit has also taken a strict approach to the
second inquiry, addressing whether punitive damages can be
considered in the jurisdictional inquiry when the amount of
compensatory damages is small compared to the punitive damages
alleged. °  Punitive damages in such a large amount may be
unattainable to a legal certainty, justifying dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. 221 In Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
prohibited the aggregation of punitive damages to satisfy the amount
in controversy requirement where the punitive/compensatory ratio
was 125: 1.222 The court noted that such an award was "bordering on
the farcical" and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 223 The Seventh Circuit revisited this issue in American
Bankers, affirming the district court's finding that a 635:1
224punitive/compensatory ratio was untenable. In another recent
Seventh Circuit opinion, the court noted that after the Supreme
Court's recent decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell,226 the court must take a realistic look at the size of
the punitive damages demanded.227 Although courts need not "train
their sight on ratios or numbers, 228 they should carefully scrutinize
claims that "assert[] a right to punitive damages at the far upper end
of the possible distribution of outcomes."
229
Recently, courts have addressed a more complex issue regarding
punitive damages: whether a claim for punitive damages in a class
action may be attributed in toto to each class member in order to
establish diversity jurisdiction, or must instead be attributed pro rata
219. Evans, 319 F.3d at 909.
220. See Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 979-80 (7th Cir.
2000).
221. See id. at 980.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Evans, 319 F.3d 907, 909-
10 (7th Cir. 2003).
225. Smith v. Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.
2003).
226. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
227. Smith, 337 F.3d at 894.
228. Id. at 896.
229. Del Vecchio v. Conseco, 230 F.3d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 2000).
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to each class member. 230 The court in Cohen v. Office Depot settled
the issue for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a punitive damages
claim must be divided among the total number of class members to
determine the amount in controversy for each class member.231 In
that case, the class representative claimed to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement because his complaint sought $10 million in
punitive damages for the entire class of 39,000 members.232 Initially,
the Eleventh Circuit followed Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service
Corp.,233 which allowed the aggregation of a punitive damages claim
under Alabama law to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement
for each class member.234 It is well established that multiple
plaintiffs may only aggregate claims if they have "a single title or
right in which they have a common and undivided interest., 235 The
Tapscott court reasoned that when state law awards punitive
damages solely to punish and deter wrongful conduct, it intends to
serve the collective good and thus gives the class a "common and
undivided interest" in the punitive damages claim.236
On petition for rehearing, however, the defendant in Cohen
argued that the Tapscott reasoning was in conflict with Lindsey v.
Alabama Telephone Co.,237 an earlier Fifth Circuit decision. 238
Almost twenty years earlier, the court in Lindsey held that punitive
damages under Alabama law, despite their purpose to punish and
deter, must be allocated pro rata to each class member.239 Because
230. See, e.g., Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (11 th
Cir. 2000).
231. Id. at 1076.
232. Id. at 1072.
233. 77 F.3d 1353 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
234. See id. at 1358. As the court explained in Cohen, the use of the word"aggregate" in this context "is commonly used by courts when addressing the
issue of whether the total amount of a class claim should be attributed to each
member of the class." 204 F.3d at 1073 n.3.
235. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); see also Bishop v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D.N.J. 1996) ("The paradigm cases of'common and undivided interest' ... are those which involve a single
indivisible res, such as an estate, a piece of property (the classic example), or
an insurance policy. These are matters that cannot be adjudicated without
implicating the rights of everyone involved with the res.").
236. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1358-59.
237. 576 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1978).
238. See Cohen, 204 F.3d at 1072.
239. See Lindsey, 576 F.2d at 595.
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the Eleventh Circuit must follow Fifth Circuit decisions rendered
before the Eleventh Circuit's creation, 240 the court in Cohen
determined that it must follow Lindsey.24 1 As a result, the plaintiff
could not use the total claim for punitive damages and failed to
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.
242
Every circuit that has addressed the issue has similarly
concluded that punitive damages cannot be aggregated in total to
24each class member for jurisdictional purposes. 3 These circuits
argue that class members' claims for punitive damages are "as
separate and distinct as their claims for actual damages.",244 After all,
a class member could sue for punitive damages in a separate lawsuit
without affecting the rights of subsequent plaintiffs to punitive
awards. 245 Class members' claims are "brought together in a class
action only for the convenience of the plaintiffs., 246 Although those
circuits that have not yet addressed the issue will likely follow the
holding in Cohen, the issue ultimately depends on the purpose of
punitive damages under a particular state law.247
2. Aggregation of attorney's fees
Attorney's fees are only included in the amount in controversy
determination when provided by contract or state law.248 In such a
situation, the amount of the judgment plus the attorney's fees is
240. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209-11 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the Fifth
Circuit delivered prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).
241. See Cohen, 204 F.3d at 1072.
242. See id. at 1077.
243. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1292-93 (10th
Cir. 2001); Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1265-68 (11th
Cir. 2000); H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,
227 F.3d 326, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2000); Gilman v. BHC Sec., Inc., 104 F.3d
1418, 1430-31 (2d Cir. 1997); Anthony v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 75 F.3d
311, 315 (7th Cir. 1996); Bishop v. Gen. Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298
(D.N.J. 1996).
244. Visintine v. Saab Auto. A.B., 891 F. Supp. 496, 498 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
245. See Bishop, 925 F. Supp. at 298.
246. Id.
247. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1280-82 (11 th
Cir. 2001).
248. See Smith v, GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1300-03 (1lth Cir. 2001);
Velez v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1979).
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considered for jurisdictional purposes.249  However, this rule
becomes more difficult in class actions, when the named plaintiff
wishes to aggregate the attorney's fees for the entire class in order to
reach the statutory minimum.250  Although courts are somewhat
divided on the issue, the recent trend is to limit aggregation in class
actions.
The Ninth Circuit precludes the named plaintiff from
aggregating the fees of the entire class,251 and several district courts
have followed this approach.252 However, the Fifth Circuit in In re
Abbott Laboratories253 allowed aggregation where a Louisiana state
law authorized the allocation of all attorney's fees to "representative
parties," or the named plaintiff or plaintiffs in a class action.254 In
the absence of such a law, however, courts are reluctant to aggregate
attorney's fees to meet the jurisdictional amount.
255
249. See San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Greenberg, 502 F. Supp. 34, 35
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 646 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1980).
250. See, e.g., Spielman v. Genzyme Corp. 251 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2001).
Although the Supreme Court has yet to discuss whether the named plaintiff in
a class action may aggregate the attorney's fees of the class, the Court did
explain in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), that "when
two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct demands, unite for
convenience and economy in a single suit, each [member of the class must]
satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement." Id. at 294. For a discussion
about whether the holding in Zahn remains good law after the enactment of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, see infra Part IV.C.4.b.
251. See Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that aggregating anticipated fees to the named plaintiff "would
conflict with the policy of [Zahn], in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the 'matter in controversy' requirement must be satisfied by each member of
the plaintiff class").
252. See, e.g., Karofsky v. Abbott Labs., 921 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D. Me. 1996);
Ratcliff v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 911 F. Supp. 177, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1995);
Quebe v. Ford Motor Co., 908 F. Supp. 446, 450 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Gilman v.
Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 507, 510 (D. Md. 1995); Visintine v. Saab
Auto. A.B., 891 F. Supp. 496,499 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
253. 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
254. Id. at 526.
255. See Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n.5 (5th Cir.
2001) (explaining that the holding in Abbott Labs. is peculiar to a Louisiana
statute and that "[tihe standard approach to awards of attorney's fees in a class
action context is to distribute them pro rata to all class members, both named
and unnamed").
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Recently, courts have been unwilling to extend the holding in
25625Abbott to allow aggregation. In Spielman v. Genzyme Corp.,257 for
example, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the Louisiana statute in
Abbott from a Massachusetts statute that allocated attorney's fees to
the "petitioner."258 The court explained that the word "petitioner" is
not the equivalent of the term "representative" in the Louisiana
statute.25 9 As a result, the court precluded aggregation and dismissed
the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26 °
This area of diversity jurisdiction represents yet another effort
by the courts to restrict diversity jurisdiction. Unless the language in
a contract or state law specifically allocates attorney's fees to the
named plaintiff or representative party, most courts will keep parties
out of federal court by prohibiting the aggregation of attorney's fees
in class actions.26'
D. Conclusion
For the most part, courts have continued to enforce Congress's
intent to restrict federal diversity jurisdiction. Only those attorneys
who recognize this trend and become familiar with the court's recent
developments will make the right forum selection decision for their
clients. After all, a wrong decision may be fatal to a client's claim if
the statute of limitations has run by the time the federal court
dismisses the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, such action may invoke sanctions against an attorney
256. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1293 & n.7 (10th
Cir. 2001) (prohibiting aggregation of attorney's fees in a class action but
noting that "[t]he result might be different if the state statute under which fees
are sought expressly awards those fees solely to the class representatives")
(emphasis added); Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1274 (1 1th
Cir. 2000).
257. 251 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id. (explaining that the term "petitioner" is a generic term in
Massachusetts law).
260. Id. at 9.
261. See id.; see also H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney
Bowes, Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000) (same result for Connecticut
statute awarding attorney's fees to "plaintiff" in a class action); Cohen v.
Office Depot, 204 F.3d 1069, 1080 n.l1 (11th Cir. 2000) (same result for
Florida statutes awarding fees to "prevailing party" or "any person
prevailing"); Darden v. Ford, 200 F.3d 753, 758 n.4 (11 th Cir. 2000) (same
result for Georgia statute awarding fees to "any person who is injured").
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under Rule 11. 26 2  Until Congress makes legislative changes to
diversity jurisdiction, it is inevitable that courts will continue to
interpret diversity jurisdiction principles in new contexts. In order to
effectively participate in the forum selection battle, attorneys must
carefully monitor the courts' various interpretations.
262. See, e.g., Int'l Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 393
(2d Cir. 1989) (imposing a $10,000 sanction on plaintiffs' attorney under Rule
11); Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 727 (D.D.C. 1984) (imposing a
$200 sanction on plaintiffs' attorney under Rule 11).
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